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The principles of risk, danger, and sociability depend on cognitive limitations and the social work 
environment. Subjects are linked in binaries or multiples where they can establish causal 
relationships or influences that lead to informal rules of behavior in the workplace. A group that 
understands what positively influences the organizational goal of avoiding accidents and losing 
energy will know the importance of keeping the fundamentals of work alive. Understanding the 
principles is the basis for research into safe, alert, and resilient behavior. From the characterization 
of the principles adopted in the form of relationships, from the established standards of good 
practices, they present hypotheses about safe behavior. The hypotheses may indicate gaps in the 
difference between what is expected for a risk activity (good practices) and what is detected from 
the observation scenarios of this industrial routine. In the cognitive analysis based on the models 
that indicate perception, attention, and memory are initial stages for the construction of the mental 
scheme of execution of preformatted procedures or elaboration of procedures in unusual situations. 
A comparative analysis for a group indicates which aspects considered as priorities for decision 
and common sense allow a more complex preparation that requires a new concept. In the job search 
are the physical, cognitive (information flow and type of communication) and organizational 
situations that can cause human error and equipment failure. Working criteria can decrease or 
increase human error. This work aims to test the principles and indicate the hypotheses through 
the analysis of scenarios and confirm the relationships of the lack of perception of risk, with the 
analysis of the work station indicating which factors of performance that influence the human 
error. When designing interventions, it is important to suggest the influence of competence level 
and quality of communication tools in a stressful environment with specific leadership. 
Interventions depend on the type of human error, therefore, on the application of intellectual 
capital, operational groups for situations under stress, change of habits and educational campaigns. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Sensitizing teams to change behavior and preparing preliminary diagnosis on the motives of lack 
of risk perception. To achieve these goals, appropriate methodologies were developed that seek to 
break down social paradigms about accidents through training work teams. Reflections in crisis 
situations assist in the elaboration of hypotheses for future interventions in operational mass and 
environments, reinforcing personal, organizational and regional safety policies. The choice of 
interventions depends on their validation in later work. It is important to distinguish the elements 
that induce unsafe behavior and the human-organizational-technical (HOT) factors that cause 
human error, losses, and accidents. The managerial, human-social and technological aspects can 
create an environment for unsafe behavior, in which they allow the flow of danger energy across 
barriers. The human and organizational factors elaborate, by events, the condition for the transfer 
of social hazard towards the physical realization of the accident or incident. 
It is crucial for the industry to focus on ways to improve their workers’ risk perception. Accidents 
may cause from small material losses (in which production is needed to stop for a while) to 
disasters involving harms to human beings or even human losses, incurring fines to the company. 
Adopting adequate safety culture always represent economic advantages for companies regardless 
the period of time for analysis, because an accident may occur at any time, not only in mid and 
long-terms.  
The work done by the authors and reported in this paper implemented a manner to calculate and 
diagnose human reliability levels in workstations. By using principles from the C4t 
(Communication, Commitment, Competence and Cooperation) tool and some industrial safety 
policies widespread, it was intended to know whether divergencies would be found on operational 
mass’ opinions about actions considered scientifically in favor of safety. Besides, if they could put 
them into practice when necessary, otherwise, get to know what prevents them to do so. High 
dispersion on responses would mean trouble in team consensus, and then a high possibility of 
workers’ arbitrary decision-making and their actions to have mutual interference, may leading to 
ineffectiveness, especially in emergency situations. Also crucial to diagnose on human reliability 
is to find whether there is training that simulates a large number of possible abnormal conditions 
at work (as hard failures on productive systems) to teach and simulate how everyone should act in 
order to the practical procedures to be the same as those taught with great efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
 
1.1 Risk and Accident Perception 
 
1.1.1 Risk and Accident Perception overview 
 
Risk and accident perception is a fundamental aspect of any person’s life, for safety in the 
workplace, at home, in leisure time, etc. It is defined as the ability to detect real signs of danger or 
even to predict the occurrence of a negative situation. The perception is often influenced by 
context, individual’s subjectivity, experience, trust, the way a problem is communicated and then 
analyzed (the Framing Effect), and even by heuristics, that are defined as cognitive processes used 
in decision-making required to be faster, in which part of not so relevant information is ignored. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) found that people overestimate results (considering the triggers as 
high-risk) from more recent and extraordinary events, for example, murders instead of thefts. 
In some cases, one may refuse to face a certain risk situation because of fear, need for protection 
or believing that the possible benefits do not make it worth risking, and then, there is no need to 
do it. The concept associated with this early evaluation is Risk Tolerance, that is, the degree of risk 
severity that a person agrees to undergo. The relationships established by people in a group also 
influence their risk perception and risk tolerance. At work, for example, influencing factors divide 
into three groups and are related to the following theories [1]. 
 



















Society’s perception that a 
certain activity is low risk. 
Harding & Eiser (1984); 




Connect to the 
organization's policies to 
decrease unnecessary high-
risk attitudes. 
Hirschi (1969); Neal et al. 
(2000); Garcia et al. (2004); 
McNeely & Falci (2004); 
Clarke & Ward (2006); Ford 
& Tetrick (2011); Chapman 








The same as in item 1 of 
this table. 












The same as in item 1 of 
this table. 




Do not consider any high-
risk attitude as irrational 
and safe attitudes as 
rational without previous 
analysis. 
Rhodes (1997); Finucane et 
al. (2000); Mullen (2004); 
Vernero & Montanari (2007); 
Choudry and Fang (2008); 
Cafri et al. (2008); Keating & 
Halpern-Felsher (2008); 







The same as in item 1 of 
this table. 









5. Level of 
knowledge 




People protect themselves 
when they predict that 
negative events may 
happen. 
Becker & Maiman (1975); 
DeJoy (1996); Mearns et al. 
(1998); Gucer et al. (2003); 
Sheeran et al. (2013); 







Engaging in higher-risk 
situations by the feel of 
being safer because of 
safety equipment. 
Wilde (1994); Aschenbrenner 
& Biehl (1994); Janssen 
(1994); Klen, (1997); Bridger 
& Freidberg (1999); 
Morrongiello et al. (2007). 
Habituated Action 
Theory 
Risk perception decreases 
over time when no 
negative events occurred 
from high-risk attitudes. 
Kasperson et al. (1988); 
Weyman & Kelly (1999); 
Weller et al. (2013). 
 
1.1.2 Perception of traffic risk 
 
Since attention is one of the requirements for good risk perception, it is known that performing 
certain activities with insufficient and/or diverted attention may cause harm. We can cite road 
transportation, in which some studies on risk perception were made in Europe by ESRA (European 
Survey of Road users ' safety Attitudes) [2]. More than 17000 respondents from 17 European 
countries participated. By the results, it was concluded that the main risk factors for road accidents 
were: driving under the effect of alcohol and drugs and lack of attention, rather than fatigue (ESRA, 
2016). The survey also showed a remarkable characteristic of people: the feeling that the risk 
imposed by another person is more serious than the one in which the individual decides to face 
himself/herself without external influence. It was concluded from the results that for all three age 
groups interviewed (18-34, 35-54, and above 55 years) the scores attributed to the feeling of safety 
(which could range from 0 to 10) had around 0.5-higher mean value for people who were car 
drivers instead of car passengers. 
 
1.2 Industry operation requirements for workstation project and 
operations control 
 
The chemical industry has specific characteristics of technology, complexity in the tasks and risk 
of accident indicated by Figure 1. The plant project needs to meet physical-technological, cognitive 
and human requirements for the development of the tasks [3], otherwise, a human error should 
probably occur. After meeting them, it is crucial to set the criteria of the workstation for the best 
operation in routine in order to get better control of the task.  
Due to the dynamics of processes, people and organizations, human error may also happen by 
behavioral (subjective and social aspects) deviances by the feeling of uncertainty in some work 
situations. It is possible to find what is the "level of adherence" (aimed in this paper) to safe 
procedures when those conditions are faced. The prediction of this behavior requires the 
measurement and monitoring of cooperation, commitment, communication, competence and stress 
levels, discussed in the C4T tool [4]. The operational control depends on the processes of 
standardization, communication, and analysis of the task and its failures. It is important to analyze 
their network relations, in addition to the way they affect or are affected by low risk perception. 
These factors are the basis for systemic (sociotechnical) failure [5], and they indicate the level of 
system reliability by function or region of process. 
The conclusions may indicate informal rules adopted by the operator. In this investigation, 
according to Ávila [6], it is useful to find: (a) The difficulty/ease in installing informal 
communicational and technological barriers; (b) The way in which the group is aligned with good 
practices and principles of risk and reliability; (c) The issues of organizational cooperation and 
commitment; (d) The analysis of safety leadership and safety culture; (e) Cognitive gaps, 
workstation criteria and human performance factors management. 
 
1.3 Risk in operating routine 
 
The research group on dynamic risk needs to measure the subjective factors in the operational 
routine to project future behavior and the quality of risk perception. It is essential to check the 
safety principles and a good sense of leadership. It is important to analyze the scenarios and 
priorities [7], in addition to indicating gaps in cognitive processing and weaknesses in the 
workstation. This investigation intends to discuss the most appropriate interventions to adjust the 
safety culture by improving the team’s risk perception, the most important input in cognitive 
processing. The C4t tool indicates the opening or closing of doors that allow the transit of danger 
energy in the human performance factors [4]. It must be considered that certain environments can 
set inadequate behavior for safety, quality, energy and cost control. 
 
1.4 New Dynamic Risk Decision Tools 
 
It was redefined not only reliability (human being, operation, process and equipment), 
sociotechnical reliability and reliability mapping, but also: factors affecting human performance 
(management, organization and operational culture), man’s behavioral elements, deviances, 
failures and cultural phenomena that establish a safety culture. Figure 1 tries to represent that 
complex analysis. Letters from A to G were positioned on Figure 1 and their whole explanation is 
on Table 2. 
 
 








Table 2 – Auxiliary table to explain Figure 1 
ITEM DESCRIPTION 
A 
Requirements/guidelines for industrial and technological layout design should be found through 
analysis balancing: organizational principles; safety conditions; and workers’ decision-making, 
performance, and limits. 
B 
Adequate interfaces should be provided to ensure clear and objective communication, avoiding 
conflicts between production-technology and workers’ social phenomena. Interface examples: 
computer screens, written procedures, general feedback. 
C 
Risk perception must follow great safety guidelines to hinder the flow of danger energy and avoid 
interrupting the task/production due to human and material losses. 
D 
Safety-based procedures (how to act) must be taught and followed more seriously at critical tasks. A 
multidisciplinary view is needed to find root/main cause(s) and system limitations. 
E 
To calculate and diagnose human reliability, it is useful to construct a diagram including equipment, 
process, operation, etc. 
F 
All risks must be mapped. If deviances in safety procedures are accepted and the flow of danger energy 
is not controlled, it may happen failures, hazardous chain reactions, occupational diseases, and 
disasters. 
G 
Simple attitudes can bring great results in risk perception and preventing accidents in order to ensure 
good work conditions. Some of them are: changing leadership, giving feedback and improving man-





A human risk perception improvement program led by the research group presented content about 
different elements of behavior and HOT factors to avoid the accident. A lecture lasting up to 8 
hours was firstly presented in a chemical industry for the operational mass. It was like a training 
with the goal of sensitizing the operational mass. The concepts issued were divided into: Principles 
to spiritualizing safety; Investigating cognitive gaps in practices; Discussing the workstation 
criteria; and analyzing how to manage human factors. 
The first block of content discusses the principles and concepts of risk, danger, reliability, behavior 
and human factors. By using examples of practical cases and routine situations, barriers to social, 
human and technological hazards are elaborated.  
In the second block, cognitive models were presented to identify where and how failures of 
perception can occur in routine practices and/or accidents. Thus, the elaboration of a mind map for 
the decision and also physical and communicational actions was considered.  
In the third block, discussions on workplace situations that can cause human errors are initiated. 
In addition, an analysis of the best criteria for the workstation is performed to identify the main 
constraints in the task and the main physical, cognitive and organizational factors. Related to these 
concepts, socio-human risk tools are presented, besides the importance of attention in industrial 
control. 
The fourth block finished the training by a discussion on how to manage and intervene to change 
unsafe behavior. Among the tools reported, there were: the socio-human risk analysis; the C4T 
technique (measurement in human factors); the classification of cultural biases, bad habits, human 
errors and incorrect decisions; and the interventions on factors and human elements. 
The preliminary diagnosis deals with the discussion of the principles and the respective hypotheses 
that should be validated in later work: cognitive gaps, risk perception, workstation criteria that 
cause errors, and management of indicators on human factors.  
A transnational chemical industry, that adapts to local cultures, allows the existence of differences 
and seeks to improve safety standards. Handling behavioral aspects in consonance with 
technological aspects is a challenge, once considered the current characteristics of the hazardous 
energy environment and the complexity of the technologies. Probably because of this, the CCPS 
(Center for Chemical Process Safety) is concentrated in the discussion about what causes 
normalization of deviances and how to avoid the accident after organizational changes.  
The different regions, leaderships, technologies, and organizations drive danger energy in the 
direction of the accident. The work of adjusting: the safety culture and the organizational culture, 
the interfaces involving the worker and the production, the quality of communication, cooperation 
levels and the level of commitment, require confirmation through routine (operator’s discourse) or 
a poll during moments of sensitization. 
 
 




A diagnosis of general and specific aspects that affect the behavior of the work team was performed 
and interventions were needed to get out of the unsafe behavior. The diagnosis was based on the 
first stage of the 4-stage training.  
The preliminary diagnosis in Figure 2 should be validated with additional safety data and 
multivariate data processing, and complementary discussion on cognition, workstation and Human 
factors.  
The interventions depend on the validation of the hypotheses. They may be related to rituals, 
training, educational processes, operative groups, knowledge against failure, adjustments of HMI 
(Human Machine Interface), alarm system or other tools in Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
and Human Factors Analysis (HFA). It may be necessary to set an investigators team.  
The training performed in the operational mass, divided into 6 groups (5 shift and one 
administrative work teams), during weekdays. The participation of the group must be active and 
adapted to limited time to provoke a break of paradigms in order to raise awareness. The "Insite" 
course for safety brings difficulties because of the intense operational routine. The questionnaires 
should not be revised, in order to avoid lack of representativeness in the statistical processing. An 




4.1 Spiritualizing safety 
 
Through 19 statements involving informal practices, principles and rules, it was intended to find 
relationships between behavioral aspects and intrinsic human performance factors or those resulted 
from managerial, organizational and operational relationships. The statements were related to 
keywords that indicate factors and elements (some showed in the most left-hand column in Table 
3): communication, competence, avoiding production-safety conflict, leadership, procedures, good 
practices, human stress, political-practical conflict, communication and feedback, task and 
excessive self-confidence. Operating mass answers were treated statistically, making them 
possible to indicate getting closer or getting away in relation to the best practices in operational 
safety. The indicators can describe behaviors that represent operational culture, shift team 
leadership, informal shift rules, and some specific cases. These indicators can also show how 
danger energy circulates through the HOT (human-organizational-technical) elements and factors 
that build the Human Factors Bayesian Network. Other important elements and factors that have 
been indirectly discussed were: risk perception, economic bias, work training, standardization and 
work memory, information flow, selection and development, risk aversion, regional and global 
culture, opportunism, deviance normalization, centralizing management, social conflicts 
(generation, gender, multiculturism), control devices, alarm management, PLC (Programmable 
Logic Controller) or interface, instruments and PSV (Pressure Safe Valve). 
 
Table 3 – 6 of the 19 questionnaire items evaluated by the authors, industry managers and 

























SUM: 1) to 
19) 
Communication                     1   2 
Competence             1           2 
Avoid Production-safety conflict 1                       2 
Leadership                   -1     -1 
Procedures       -1                 -1 
Good practices     1                   1 
Human Stress                 1     -1 -1 
Political-practical conflict           -1             -2 
Communication and Feedback         1               1 
Task               -1         -1 




4.2 Group of issues in subject classes 
 
The 19 sentences, here sometimes called ‘questions’ (because it was questioned about operational 
mass’ opinions afterwards), could be grouped into blocks of similar subjects: communication 
(questions 1; 11; 18), in which the answers showed a tendency to decrease the safety levels, 
demonstrating that the feedback is not enough and there may be a conflict between company 
policies and practice during routine and emergency. Competence (2, 13 and 15) had a high level 
of safety, indicating employees’ good competence, but the drop at question 15 showed a certain 
level of excessive self-confidence. Results from the conflict of priority between production and 
safety (items 3 and 6) demonstrated a tendency to normalization of deviance. Guilt culture and 
feedback in the procedure (7 and 8) results showed that culture is a strong factor in the company, 
which hinders the execution of good practices There was a low percentage that had perception 
about the need to "pay attention " in the context. Other results from the study appear after colon 
punctuations. Stress management by leadership (items 10 and 17): high positive percentage, a good 
perception for the influence of human factors by everyone, although dispersion on the answers 
resulted also high. Cooperation and Leadership (4, 12 and 14): despite demonstrating a leadership 
profile with active listening, the low percentage in favor of safety in questions 12 and 14 may 
indicate conflicts in leadership relations or between the staff and the shift teams, and a lack of 
adequacy at the workstation, task, and team. Commitment and fair culture (5, 9, 16 and 19): there 
was a fair culture, with employees committed to safety, and it is needed that the use of PPE 
(Personal Protective Equipment) by people becomes a habit in everyday life. 
 
4.3 Question, sense and statistics for safety response 
 
Before showing and commenting on the data collected from the questionnaire applied to a 
Brazilian chemical industry company, it is necessary to say that they represent correctly what is 
seen in most of chemical and other industries, although the data are not exactly the same because 
of their right of confidentiality. For this same reason, the region where it is located and also the 
technology used in their processes cannot be unveiled. 
The 19 questions were grouped according to the 4.2 topic and the operational mass’ answers for 
some of them were described in Table 4, where blue means the percentage of opinions in favor of 
safety; those in red, against safety.  
Some of the 19 sentences had their meaning been inverted before the questionnaire was given to 
the workers. These sentences are signaled by an asterisk in the end (Table 4). The inversion was 
due for not asking their opinions always the same way. That is, if a person sees many sentences 
scientifically in favor of safety, his/her first positive opinions about them tends to influence the 
other questions answers by the reason of being already accustomed to response positively. Once a 
sentence was inverted, by for example, putting the word ‘NOT’ in the middle (as on item 13 in 
Table 4), when a worker considered it against safety, the answer was registered at that table as in 
favor of safety, and vice-versa.  
The key words indicating the subject are in the last column of the right. The positive (in blue) 
answers were statistically treated. Sentences evaluated by around and/or above 70% of respondents 
as favorable to safety, partially favorable and against safety were highlighted as following. In 
favor: competence, perception, emergency task, routine patterns, control stress; Partially 
favorable: workstation and operator’s function; Against: operational culture and guilt culture.  
 
Table 4 – Averages of 6 operational mass groups’ opinions for statements (items) as in favor, 
















is no feedback 
without them.








and action must 
be repeated as 
risk level 
increases.
No 48% 24% 28%
Perception of risk; 
communication and 











action in urgent 
situations. *
Answers A were considered F 
and vice-versa, due to the 







































Answers A were considered F 
and vice-versa, due to the 
inversion of original statement 
meaning.
70% 23% 7%
Stress (routine and 
emergency) and 
leadership.
4.4 General behavior and comparison by teams in classes (Shift or staff) 
 
The chart above, with the average of the 6 groups’ opinions, was compared with the chart per 
training class for each one of the 19 questions. The discussion is about specific or general behaviors 
detected when the results from different teams are compared, in each question, to the mean values 
showed in Table 4. Some conclusions were as follows. 
Questions 11 and 18 obtained from 18 to 45% of conviction of all classes interviewed that they 
had unsafe behavior. This fact indicated that problems use to occur between policies and practices 
not compatible with routine, besides low feedback. In addition, communication and action are not 
redundant as the risk increases.  
Question 18 approaches communication and action. With the proposal that redundancy in 
communication and action raises attention to prevent deviance, it was obtained in all groups from 
5 to 35% of the opinions as being against safety. In the average for all groups, the result was 28%.  
Question 3, which stated that the "competition between measurements adopted in services and 
their quality hinders cooperative and safe work". The opinions obtained in each class range from 
15% to 58% against security (29% for the mean value from all the classes). 
The statement in item 13 was clearly linked to safe behavior. In all classes, 87% or 100% agreed 
that adequate knowledge to develop the activity includes attitude and action in the urgency task, 
and this would make the work safer. 
Questions 13, 2, 18 are about issues in communication and competence. Although there were more 
answers in favor of safety, there were also other responses. Those questions were about policies 
and practices, observing deviances and communicating, etc. 
The comparison involving results from an average for the 6 groups (those in Table 4) and 2 
specifics of them, is shown in Figure 3. The 6 items detailed were, in sequence, 17, 8, 3, 13, 18 




Figure 3 – Comparison between some groups’ opinions and the average for 6 of 19 items 
evaluated by operational mass as in favor, partially or against safety. 
 
4.5 Positive responses and Standard Deviation: an analysis by group and 
by question 
 
In this analysis, it is important to establish the following criteria. An average of high results in 
favor of safety (close to 100%) with a low dispersion, that is, less variability in questionnaire 
answers indicates higher values for the ratio between positive mean and dispersion (positive 
mean/standard deviation), which indicates high safety. The smallest results for that ratio indicate 
the worst safety (these answers show the non-effectiveness of leadership in the safety culture). 
Thus, the best results were for Q1 (To ask in doubt), Q4 (active listening vs pressure for results), 
Q13 (sufficient knowledge for emergency tasks) and Q19 (commitment). The items with worst 
scores follow: Q11 (compatible policies and practices), Q18 (redundancy in communication and 
signs of deviance), Q12 (operator’s social and family roles versus operator’s function), Q14 
(positioning in workstation due to supervision). Table 5 shows some notes about specific results. 
Group E was divided into Group E(1) and Group E(2) parts because it was originally the biggest 
among all teams. 
 
Table 5 – Some comments on the results for average and Standard Deviation 
 
Considering all the questionnaire, the following risk map could be constructed: 
 
Table 6 – Risk map for the results from average/SD 
Mean value 
for safety 
0 – 25    Q11, Q12, Q14 
25.1 – 50 Q5, Q9, Q16 Q2   
50.1 – 75   
Q4, Q8, Q10, 
Q17 
 
75.1 – 100 
Q1, Q4, Q13, 
Q19 
   
 0 – 25 25.1 – 50 50.1 – 75 75.1 – 100 
 Standard Deviation from safety value. 
 
It may also be interesting to see the values for positive mean/SD for each of the 6 teams in each 
question. Figure 4 shows: 
 
Worst results Medium results Best results 
Question 11: All classes. Questions 9 for Group E(2). 
Q1 (ask in 
doubt) 
Question 18 (except class 
E, part 2). 
Questions 8; and 17 (procedures; and 





In question 2:  
 
class E (part 1) and class 
D had low values. 
 




Figure 4 – Ratio Positive Mean/SD per group and per item plot 
 
4.6 General results for Operational Culture 
 
Figure 5 shows that for all the 19 items evaluated, each group had from 56% to 61% of positive 
opinions (they perceived them as in favor of safety). For a well-established safety culture, it is 
expected values above 75%. In terms of uniformity in response, around 27 to 32% in the standard 
deviation (SD). Thus, considering the groups mean value for F (favorable responses) and SD, the 
ratio F/SD = 58.5/29.5 = 1.98. Best results would range from 2.5 to 3.  
Team C had the worst performance in favor of safety and the teams A and E2 had very good 
results. 
In Figure 5, by the plot for positive mean and SD for each question, it is noted that the highest 
score in favor of safety and the lowest standard deviation is the best result. Thus, in terms of 
positive responses, the highest were: Q1 (communication), Q13 (competence), Q19 
(Commitment), Q8 (procedure), Q4 (cooperation), Q5 (commitment) and Q9 (fair culture) are the 
best results. The worst results: Q6 (conflict between production and security), Q7 (Procedures), 
Q12 (lack of cooperation), Q14 (cooperation and leadership).  
In terms of standard deviation, smaller results indicate higher certainty, then: Q1, Q13, Q4, Q19. 
Higher results for SD indicate much dispersion in the group when commenting on the statements, 
thus, Q18, Q3, Q16. The dispersion results for other questions were normal, around 10%. 
By dividing the positive responses by standard deviation, we have the following result: Q1, Q13, 
Q4, Q19 with very high values in favor of safety (above 10.0). The following questions scored 
badly, under 5.0: Q11 (communication), Q18 (communication), Q2 (competence), Q15 
(competence), Q3 (priority production versus security), Q6 (priority production versus security), 
Q7 (procedure), Q12 (cooperation), Q14 (cooperation). 
 
Figure 5 – General results for Operational Culture per item and per group. The word ‘Average’ 
at the plots titles means the same as ‘Positive Mean’, said before 
 
4.7 New Concept: Intrinsic Relationship, Work Network, Graphs and 
Perception 
 
Inadequate safety conditions that can cause incidents may incur problems of higher severity, that 
is, accidents. The chemical industry, in general, has decreased the number of incidents throughout 
the last years, but there is almost no reduction of accidents with or without lost days. There is, 
apparently, no connection between the various risks that might trigger situations of danger in 
routine, which makes no sense. It is noted, therefore, that results like above are caused by cases of 
no notification for serious problems, because of guilt culture, no priority in safety, and others. 
There is a gap between the safety asked by organizations, as in policies adopted, and the safety 
seen in practice. 
The behavior present in many industries nowadays can be called as ‘reactive’, that is, it only starts 
to react in terms of safety and organizational culture after an accident occurs. The goal to be 
achieved by any organization that seeks to work well by balancing production, safety and human 
factors, is a proactive behavior with good leadership(s). Protective actions to avoid accidents all 
the time, especially when it is seen any deviation of conduct or even signs indicating a possibility 
of danger in the future, commonly known as predictive behavior. It is useful the following to 
activate that behavioral model: enhancing the safety culture, improving the availability and quality 
of trainings, make security and operation work together, promoting better active listening and clear 
communication, acknowledge good practices, managing risks, changes and incidents, and 
effectively integrating actions in different organizational areas to improve risk perception. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Reliability and human factors in workstation design 
 
5 Conclusions & Future Work 
 
Some important points collected from the results of the diagnosis were: (1) Change the idea of the 
best work team for the one that reviews and respects the safety-based procedure; (2) Do not inspire 
fear for delay or possibility of failure; (3) Get to know how to discuss conflicts and priorities 
through good practices and giving feedback; (4) To understand that communication must be 
redundant because there might be some incorrect information; (5) Observe the real scenario before 
critical actions; (6) Take care when accelerating services and seek to set a climate of cooperation. 
Besides, it is important to intensify strong points bonds as: (7) emergency knowledge; (8) in doubt, 
always ask; (9) communicate any deviations; (10) Keep the stress controlled; (11) Active listening; 
(12) The patterns for the routine; and (13) avoid losses. 
Risk and Human factors are often subjective, which hinders the application of appropriate 
techniques that can see the present moment and then design the future. Resilient organizations 
need to develop tools to confirm the risk perception in industrial critical tasks. Many companies 
with stable safety programs have encountered behavioral changes and unexpected accidents, 
confirming the lack of perception of changes over time in teams and leadership. Thus, low risk 
perception should be diagnosed from different perspectives that include: culture (principles), 
operation (cognition and practices), design (criteria for the workstation) and management 
(identification and measurement of human factors quality). This work was done in a real case of 
the chemical industry and complex process from questions elaborated after research on human 
factors. It intends, in the future, to help build the Bayesian Network indicating the regions, 
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